Lenin Core Of The Politburo

The Reality of History and the Myths of Politics

Selected articles from the book “Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics” by Sakharov V.A.

Translation from Russian by Comrade Svitlana, Marxist Leninist Discussion Group, and few by paid translator. (Final book and articles here may have slight differences)

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During 1921, in parallel with the aggravation of the political confrontation between Lenin and Trotsky, there was a process of strengthening the positions of the "Lenin core" in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the RCP (b). It began to take shape on the eve of the 10th Party Congress during the “discussion about trade unions”. The Leninist core, or, as it was sometimes called, the “Leninist group” * included, in addition to Lenin, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and also Molotov, who was then secretary of the Central Committee and the first candidate for membership in the Politburo.

In the literature an opinion that was not entirely accurate has been established about the nature of political relations within the Leninist group. It is usually believed that Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev were completely dependent on Lenin, and if they showed independence, it was only in the form of political intrigue. This, of course, was not true.

Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev were established and authoritative party leaders. It is also believed that the closest people to Lenin were Zinoviev and Kamenev [408]. The statistics of Lenin's contacts cited in the previous paragraph tell a different story: Lenin's closest political contacts were with Stalin, and the favorite of traditional historiography, Zinoviev, turned out to be the least connected with Lenin by constant political work. The same is indicated by the mailing list of information reports of the OGPU, which was also discussed above. Only for a short time (from July 26 to September 26) Zinoviev was listed third on this list, and then disappears from it [409].

From September 27, 1921, the beginning of the list takes the following form: 1) Lenin, 2) Stalin, 3) Trotsky and Sklyansky, 4) Molotov and Mikhailov [410]. Kamenev appears in it only on March 9, 1922, at number five [411], soon moving to fourth place, immediately after Trotsky [412].

LENIN AND ZINOVIEV

The foregoing indicates that Zinoviev, as part of the core of the Leninist group, had the weakest position. Volkogonov records the cooling of Lenin's relations with Zinoviev after October 1917, but he does not know the reasons for this [413]. Indeed, the reasons are not clear in the historical literature. Even M .I. Ulyanova spoke very vaguely on this score:

“I think that for a number of personal reasons ... towards Zinoviev] the attitude of Vladimir] [Ilyich] was not good. But even here he again restrained himself for the sake of the interests of the cause. According to Molotov, “Lenin valued him as a journalist ... because he often did not have a suitable person at hand who would quickly write, catching his thoughts ... Lenin did not trust Zinoviev ... The correspondence between Lenin and Zinoviev shows that Lenin was dissatisfied with Zinoviev every now and then, because he swayed, although he pretended to be a Leninist” [415].

Apparently, this is correct. The reasons for Lenin's cool relationship with Zinoviev apparently go back to the period of emigration, to the disappointment associated with the position he took in October 1917, as well as during the civil war (during which Zinoviev again showed himself as a person subject to panic moods). No wonder Zinoviev became a member of the Politburo only in 1921, at the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b), after he actively supported Lenin against Trotsky during the discussion on trade unions. It is possible that Zinoviev's isolation from Moscow affected, as well as the heavy workload of the Comintern, which in 1921-1922. as the importance of domestic politics and economic issues gradually lost their importance. At the same time, the contacts between Lenin and Zinoviev on these issues lost their former significance. Perhaps the leader's habits of the ambitious Zinoviev, associated with his position in the Comintern, had an effect.

In the autumn of 1921, Lenin was greatly troubled by the conflict that broke out in the Petrograd party organization, which was facilitated by Zinoviev's political pretensions. Zinoviev accused the secretariat of the Petrogubkom RCP (b) of insolvency, and the secretary of the Petrograd provincial committee of the RCP (b) N.A. Uglanova in violation of the terms for convening the provincial party conference. Uglanov and his supporters accused Zinoviev of wrong methods of work, of violating the principle of collective leadership [416]. Party activists supported Uglanov [417].

On September 20, 1921, Zinoviev reported to the Central Committee of the party that a "serious party conflict" had broken out in Petrograd, and asked for a call to Moscow to settle it [418]. The Politburo summoned the leaders of the Petrograd organization "for comradely negotiations" and created a commission to resolve the conflict, consisting of Lenin, Stalin, and Molotov. As Uglanov recalls, at Lenin's insistence, an informal discussion of this problem was held without Zinoviev and secretly from him in Stalin's apartment [419].

On September 22, Lenin wrote the "Resolution of the Politburo Commission on the Question of the Petro[grad] Organization", Stalin and Molotov signed it. The commission actually supported the "young" against Zinoviev [420].

On September 23, the Politburo heard a resolution prepared by the commission on the question of the Petrograd party organization and approved it with one addition [421].

This conflict had another facet, which is indicated by Zinoviev's letter sent on September 29, 1921 from Petrograd to Lenin. Trying to bring the conflict, which was based on disagreements in matters of organizational and party work, to the level of fundamental political differences, Zinoviev reported bad moods in Petrograd, seeing the reason for them in the activities of his opponents. Zinoviev believed that the mood in St. Petersburg, which is a "barometer", "foreshadows something new and extremely dangerous inside parties." If he often leaves St. Petersburg for Moscow, then the influence of this group in the city will increase.

The reader must have concluded that the danger to the party and the revolution would also increase. And then another, perhaps the main twist of the theme followed. "Frightening" Lenin with the prospect of a threat to the revolution, Zinoviev offers a choice:

"Either transfer the Comintern to St. Petersburg, or I leave Petrograd and move to Moscow."

Further, he gave weak arguments against the transfer of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to Petrograd and formulated the main thesis of the letter:

“I can’t imagine who in St. Petersburg could replace me now in such a difficult period.” With substitution goes badly. The workers don't like it. I don't know how to be. It will be necessary to raise the issue at the Plenum and decide in principle” [422].

Zinoviev's desire is quite easy to read - to transfer the apparatus of the Comintern from Moscow to Petrograd and get more free hands in Comintern issues, to strengthen his positions in the Comintern, and in Petrograd, and, consequently, in the Politburo.

On September 29, Lenin, on behalf of the Politburo commission, wrote a letter to Zinoviev (it was also signed by Stalin and Molotov), which testifies that Zinoviev’s innermost intention was clear to him and that he could not count on the support of the Politburo:

“The three of us (Molotov, Stalin, and I) discussed your letter as a commission chosen by the Central Committee.

As before, we cannot agree with you... There are no differences of principle in St. Petersburg, there is not even a bias to bias. Neither Komarov nor Uglanov, who were the most reliable at the Tenth Congress of the RCP, also at the Metal Workers' Congress, have none of this. These comrades could not have gone downhill so suddenly. We have not seen a shadow of facts to prove this. There is a legitimate desire of the majority to be the majority and replace the group through which you "ruled" with another. People have grown up and therefore their desire is legitimate. There is no need to push them into a deviation, speaking of "fundamental differences". It is necessary to carefully carry out ideological leadership, fully allowing the new majority to be the majority and govern. [423]

Zinoviev's proposal to move the ECCI to Petrograd was rejected, but the conflict continued and was not settled soon [424]. This story suggests that Lenin "did not bet" on Zinoviev and, therefore, did not value him as highly as his other associates.

How dissatisfied Lenin was with Zinoviev at that time is evidenced by the fact that on November 16, Lenin, while preparing a collection of his articles for publication, decided to recall the old story about how Zinoviev and the "St. Petersburg" people "tricked" him with the publication of his pamphlet:

“St. Petersburg residents are extremely fond of showing their independence at all costs, even to the point of not fulfilling the author’s request, which is binding on all other people, comrades, and citizens, in all countries and in all republics, even Soviet ones (with the exception of independent St. Petersburg)... cunning was added to "independence", and I was finally left in the cold"[425].

Lenin was preparing a public rebuke, but for some reason he decided not to publish this preface and, apparently, soon regretted it. In any case, on November 22, 1921, Stalin sent a note:

“C. Lenin This document once again shows that it was not necessary to refuse to publish the well-known preface to Lenin's latest pamphlet, On the New Economic Policy. I. Stalin” [426].

Of course, Zinoviev occupied a prominent position in the leadership of the party. This is evidenced by the fact that at the Eleventh Congress he makes two reports (on the strengthening of the party and on the Comintern). At the same time, at the congress, he was subjected to rather harsh criticism by both opponents and supporters of Lenin [427]. Lenin did not say a word in defense of Zinoviev.

The fact that there was a certain distance between Lenin and Zinoviev in personal and political relations is indicated by the practice of Lenin's visits. There is a group of cases in the fund of Lenin's secretariat, which contain notes to Lenin with requests to accept their authors. A lot of people made such requests, among them Lunacharsky, Pyatakov, Nogin, Mezhlauk, Menzhinsky, V. Obolensky, Preobrazhensky, Serebrovsky, Semashko and others. There are no notes only from Stalin, Trotsky, and Kamenev. But there are notes from Zinoviev [428].

Obviously, Zinoviev belonged to the group of those who asked for a meeting, and did not come to Lenin when necessary. For example, in a note dated October 9, 1922, Zinoviev asked to be informed when Lenin would be able to receive him to discuss the issues of the Urquhart concession, the Stalin commission, the Plenum of the Central Committee, and others. [429] The absence of close relations between them is also evidenced by the fact that in the summer of 1922, during Lenin's illness and his stay in Gorki, Zinoviev visited Lenin only twice (August 1 and September 2) **, i.e. much less than Stalin and even Kamenev [430].

LENIN AND KAMENEV

Kamenev's political and power positions were much stronger than those of Zinoviev, which was determined primarily by his political closeness to Lenin as one of the main developers of the NEP and an active participant in the creation of a new economic mechanism. This is evidenced by a comparison of the statistics of contacts with Lenin, the nature of their correspondence, and the practice of sending out OGPU reports. Being one of the developers of the NEP, Kamenev, together with Lenin, opposed Trotsky. I.P. Donkov states:

“The range of problems on which Vladimir Ilyich spoke with Kamenev was extremely diverse. Only in 1922 did Lenin have a detailed conversation with him about the work of the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO, about the work of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), discusses the problems of establishing prosecutorial supervision, the state of finances and prospects for the harvest, the work of the Finance Committee, issues of tariff policy, position in the People's Commissariat of Railways, monetary reform, the development of economic ties with the business community of America, the provision of concessions to L. Urquhart, the estimate of the People's Commissariat of War, the creation of the Union of Socialist Republics, the strengthening of the monopoly of foreign trade "[431].

This list can be expanded, but in general it correctly conveys the spectrum and nature of Lenin's constant contacts with Kamenev. It is clear from the documents that they were not only trusting and respectful, but also warm and comradely. According to Molotov, Lenin “loved” Kamenev more than Zinoviev, and highly valued his business qualities [432]. He said this in his last speech at a meeting of the Moscow Council on November 20, 1922 [433] At the same time, it is noteworthy that Lenin noted not the political, but precisely the businesslike qualities of Kamenev. Obviously, this is no coincidence, anyway, in their daily contacts, economic issues dominate over party and general political issues. The available documents say that the current economic work overwhelmed Kamenev more and more, there was less and less time left to participate in solving other issues, which is probably why his participation in the affairs of the party management is barely visible, and participation in solving issues that go beyond purely economic (except for those that were discussed collectively in the Politburo) can, without fear of making a mistake, be characterized as episodic. D.A. Volkogonov believed that

“Kamenev could influence Lenin gradually, imperceptibly” [434].

This is a correct observation; we must agree with it. In any case, a number of his letters on the question of the principles of unification of the Soviet republics allow us to admit the idea of an attempt to play a card of contradictions between Lenin and Stalin: he wrote to Lenin about his fundamental solidarity with him, and to Stalin as if they had no disagreements with Stalin. .

LENIN AND STALIN

Documents available to historians allow us to say that it was no accident that Stalin occupied a special place in the Leninist group. With the exception of Lenin, compared to other members of the Politburo, Stalin had much stronger, more reliable, stable ties with the party organizations, which was a good help to Lenin, strengthening his position in the face of Trotsky's attacks.

That gave Lenin at his disposal additional knowledge of local conditions, workers, their strengths and weaknesses, and the relationship between them. Of course, Lenin could have received this knowledge not only from Stalin, but in the person of Stalin he received both knowledge and one of the most prominent members of the party leadership, whose political positions were always close to Lenin's on all major issues, an ally capable of successfully fighting against Trotsky. No one but Stalin could provide Lenin with such a combination of political qualities in the Central Committee of the RCP (b), therefore, in this situation, Stalin was indispensable for Lenin in leading the party and in the fight against Trotsky.

The experience of the political struggle during the years of the Civil War (especially the background and the course of the discussion of the military issue at the Eighth Party Congress) said that Stalin was capable of not only "taking the blow" of Trotsky, but also "taking" him with a "stranglehold."

In the course of the discussion on trade unions, Stalin once again showed the ability to wage a successful struggle against Trotsky. In historiography, Stalin's participation in the trade union discussion is usually silent, it is only noted that he supported Lenin and signed the "platform of 10". This is true, but, in addition, Stalin not only actively spoke during the discussion (article "Our Differences", January 5, 1921) [435], but was one of the organizers of the struggle against Trotsky and other anti-Leninist groups in Moscow. Trotskyist R. B. Raphael, knowing this firsthand, at the Tenth Party Congress said that in St. Petersburg the campaign against Trotsky (discussion) was led by Zinoviev, and in Moscow - under the leadership of Stalin [436].

That which separated Lenin from Trotsky politically also separated Trotsky from Stalin. In particular, Stalin not only understood and accepted the NEP (which is sometimes denied), but was also an active promoter of it. A good ally in the fight against a serious enemy never hurts, and in the conditions of the onset of an illness that reduced Lenin's efficiency, Stalin turned for Lenin from an important ally into the main support. It is not surprising that Stalin's political positions during 1921, especially from the middle to the second half of 1921, were rapidly strengthening.

According to Molotov, “Lenin had no friends in the Politburo... Lenin had closer relations with Stalin, but more on a business basis. He ... not only raised Stalin - he made him his support in the Central Committee. And trusted him. In the last period, Lenin was very close to Stalin, and Lenin was perhaps, the only one visited him at his apartment” [437]. The most indicative of Lenin's personal relationship with Stalin at that time is the human concern that Lenin showed for him - his health, rest, organization of work, life, and family.

In historiography, such concern is regarded as an important indicator of a warm comradely attitude towards this or that person. It's right. There are numerous manifestations of Lenin's concern for Bukharin, Rykov, Tsyurupa, Dzerzhinsky and others.[438] Russian historiography, with rare exceptions, spoke about these cases willingly. Only historians were unanimously silent about Stalin. Meanwhile, the documents testify that, firstly, in the last years of Lenin’s life, perhaps no one [439] was honored with such an attentive and caring attitude from Lenin as Stalin, and, secondly, the manifestation of this care has been growing since 1921.

At the end of 1920, Stalin fell ill, Lenin writes: “Comrade Butt! I beg you to send Stalin 4 bottles of the best port wine. Stalin must be reinforced before the operation. And after that, he writes to Fotieva, so that she can follow up on the fulfillment of his request [440].

In April 1921, during Stalin's illness, Lenin expressed a desire to visit him and received an invitation [441]. In May 1921, Stalin went on vacation to the Caucasus. A number of telegrams have been preserved, which were exchanged between Lenin and G.K. in May-July 1921. Ordzhonikidze, who was then chairman of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), about the rest and treatment of Stalin. They testify to Lenin's close attention to the organization of rest and treatment of Stalin [442]. Lenin showed similar care later, being interested in his health, talking with the attending physician. On December 28, 1921, already seriously ill himself, Lenin wrote to Fotieva Butt (doctor) about Stalin"[443].

It is interesting to compare the manifestations of Lenin's concern for Stalin and for Trotsky. There is little documentary evidence of Lenin's concern for Trotsky, but most importantly, they are dry, formal, similar to necessary replies [444].

On May 14, 1921, Lenin received a note from People's Commissar of Health Semashko about Trotsky's deteriorating health (colitis due to overwork and non-compliance with the diet) with a request to take the necessary measures. Lenin, in response to this letter and to Molotov's statement that problems in supplying Trotsky with food arose in view of the fact that there was no one responsible for his supply, wrote to Molotov: “Wasn’t there someone in charge”? It is absolutely necessary to always appoint them in order to know exactly who is to be reprimanded, who is to be arrested. This is the only way to work.” [445] Apparently, Lenin was interested not so much in the problems of Trotsky as in the organization of supply in general.

A different attitude towards Zinoviev. On May 15, 1921, due to overwork, another “heart attack” occurred, which lasted about a day. Information about this came to Lenin from the Kremlin hospital. Lenin responded with a note to Molotov, suggesting that the Politburo give Zinoviev a rest [446].

Concerned about improving Stalin's living conditions, Lenin at least twice (in November 1921 and in February 1922) wrote letters to the relevant authorities with a request to find a more suitable (warmer and quieter) housing for Stalin's family [447]. The head of the Kremlin museums, N. Sedova-Trotskaya (Trotsky's wife), sent a letter to Lenin regarding this request:

“Dear Vladimir Ilyich, I am not angry, but you, forgive me, show unjustified softness. Of course, Comrade Stalin must be provided with a quiet apartment, and we must do this. But Comrade Stalin is a living person, not a museum rarity and does not want to live in a museum himself, he refuses the premises that are being imposed on him, just as Comrade Zinoviev refused the same premises last year.”

Comrade Stalin would like to occupy the apartment in which Flaxerman and Malkov are now staying: Flaxerman (youth) could be transferred to Comrade Stalin’s apartment, and Comrade Malkov to the 2nd House of Soviets, where 60 rooms are being vacated .. .

If you, Vladimir Ilyich, do not agree with all this, and even with the protest of Comrade Stalin himself, then I ask you to order the surrender of 4 (four) rooms, leaving the other four rooms behind the Main Museum, where we will transfer everything ... " [448].

The underlining in the text, which belongs to Lenin, indicates that he did not agree with her arguments and continued to insist on his own. Since the fulfillment of his request was delayed, Lenin again writes, reminds, gets angry, demands an urgent solution to the housing problem [449]. In the end, Stalin got a new apartment***.

And one more small but revealing manifestation of Lenin's concern for Stalin's family, and possibly for his political prestige, which could have suffered due to the exclusion of his wife N.S. Alliluyeva from the party during the purge due to her insufficiently active participation in party work. At the same time, the fact that at that time her first child, Vasily was born, was ignored. Lenin considered this circumstance a good reason and petitioned for her reinstatement in the party [450].

If this is not the only, then, in any case, an extremely rare case of such a petition.

Of course, there was no idyll in the relationship between Lenin and Stalin. Stalin did not lose his own political face, and his political temperament and writing differed in many respects from Lenin's. Stalin had an independent political position, his own view of all problems. Hence the disagreements with Lenin arose from case to case, but did not touch on fundamental issues. Documents have been preserved showing that on a number of issues they took somewhat different positions and openly pointed out to each other their disagreement.

So, in the autumn of 1921, disagreements arose over the policy that G.I. Safarov. Lenin believed:

“In my opinion, Safarov is quite right,”

and Stalin objected:

“In my opinion, Safarov is wrong, and his policy is harmful"[451].

In November 1921, a conflict arose, fraught with complications, but, apparently, successfully settled. He was associated with Krupskaya, who almost turned a political problem into a problem of personal relations. Stalin, heading from August 1921 the Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), began the reorganization and reduction of its apparatus by combining the duties of its employees [452].

It was assumed that Agitprop would put Glavpolitprosvet (the structure of the People's Commissariat of Education, which was headed by Krupskaya as deputy people's commissar) under its control. The leadership of the People's Commissariat of Education agreed only to send a member of the Central Committee to their department and saw in Stalin's actions a threat to the former independence of the Glavpolitprosveta. Krupskaya sharply opposed, while resorting to the means available to her - direct pressure on Lenin, presenting to him the forthcoming reorganization as the creation of a new people's commissariat. Lenin, apparently, believed her and wanted to raise this issue to the Orgburo without first explaining to Stalin. Stalin, having learned about this, sent a letter to Lenin (November 1921), which is very revealing and important for revealing the political and personal relations that existed between them.

"Comrade Lenin”, wrote Stalin.

“We are dealing either with a misunderstanding or with frivolity. Comrade Krupskaya read Comrade Solovyov's draft, which I had not reviewed, and the Organizing Bureau had not approved and decided that they were creating a new Commissariat Comrade. Krupskaya was in a hurry She was in a hurry again (our italics. - B.C.).

Stalin wrote that Agitprop was going to be reduced, not expanded, he proved this on concrete material and explained the functions of the reorganized Agitprop. And most importantly:

“Today's note from yours addressed to me (it is not yet available to researchers. - BC) I understood in such a way that you are raising the question of my leaving agitprop. You remember that work in agitprop was imposed on me (I myself did not aspire to it). It follows that I should not object to leaving. But if you put the question right now, in connection with the misunderstandings outlined above, then you will embarrass both yourself and me (Trotsky and others will think that you are doing this "because of Krupskaya", that I agree to be a "victim", etc.), which is undesirable.""

Stalin suggested creating a commission (Stalin, Krupskaya, Lunacharsky) and in it, in a working order, to remove the misunderstanding that had arisen, and not to submit the issue to the Organizing Bureau without this [453].

For our topic, it is important to note the definite nature of the relationship between Lenin and Stalin, between them and Trotsky, between Stalin and Krupskaya. The difficult relationship between Stalin and Krupskaya apparently already had its own history, in which Krupskaya's "hurriedness" had already led to problems between them. Lenin was well aware of this, and therefore Stalin does not consider it necessary to reveal his remark ("again"). Judging by the letter, Stalin knew that Trotsky was eyeing the relationship between him and Krupskaya, who was not averse to using it to aggravate personal relations between Lenin and Stalin. Lenin knew about it too.

One way or another, but this story had no visible consequences for the relationship between Lenin and Stalin. Stalin remained until the XI Congress of the RCP (b) the head of Agitprop and carried out the reform he had begun, and at the congress itself he became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party with the active participation of Lenin.

* Hereinafter, when using the expressions "Lenin's core" or "Lenin's group", the author does not mean a factional group, since Lenin's supporters constituted an absolute majority, determined the political course, and therefore, in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism, had every right to speak on behalf of the whole — Politburo and Central Committee. A fraction, as you know, is a part of it that opposes the whole.

** At that time he was in Moscow and participated in the work of the XII Conference of the RCP(b).

*** Later, Trotsky claimed that Stalin encroached on part of the royal palace in the Kremlin, wanting to settle down in it, and only thanks to the vigilance and integrity of N. Sedova-Trotskaya, these intentions were thwarted (Trotsky L.D. Joseph Stalin. Characteristics experience / / Portraits of revolutionaries, pp. 54-55). In 1935, A. Barbusse described Stalin's apartment:

“Here, in the Kremlin ... there is a small three-story house. This house ... used to be a service room at the palace; some royal servant lived in it.

We go up the stairs. There are white linen curtains on the windows. These are the three windows of Stalin's apartment. In the tiny front hall, a long soldier's overcoat catches the eye, a cap hangs over it. Three rooms and a dining room. Furnished simply, as in a decent but modest hotel. The dining room has an oval shape ... In a capitalist country, neither such an apartment nor such furniture would be satisfied with an average employee ... ”( Barbusse A. Stalin. A man through whom a new world is revealed. M., 1936. P. 5-6 ).

Notes:

[408] Likhodeev L. A battlefield where there were no wounded // Friendship of peoples. 1988. No. 9. S. 171.

[409] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2622. L. 85; D. 2623. L. 141.

[410] Ibid. D. 2623. L. 146; D. 2624 - 2636.

[411] Ibid. D. 2629. L. 61; D. 2630.

[412] Ibid. D. 2631. L. 136; D. 2632 - 2636.

[413] Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 56-57.

[414] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 197.

[415] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. pp. 182-183.

[416] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 2, pp. 117–119.

[417] Uglanov N.A. About Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (in the period 1917-1922). January 5, 1925 // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 196.

[418] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 206–207.

[419] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 196.

[420] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 223–224.

[421] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 207. L. 1.

[422] Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24631. L. 2–3.

[423] Ibid. D. 24636. L. 1–1 rev., 3.

[424] Ibid. D. 24645. L. 1; D. 24647. L. 1.

[425] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 247–248.

[426] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 4676. L. 1.

[427] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. pp. 430, 431.

[428] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 791.

[429] Ibid. L. 6.

[430] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 201.

[431] Donkov I.P. Lev Borisovich Kamenev // Issues of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 4. S. 95.

[432] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 183.

[433] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 300.

[434] Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 61.

[435] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 4–14.

[436] Tenth Congress of the RCP(b). March 1921 Stenograph. report. M., 1961. S. 98.

[437] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 193.

[438] Such documents are available in relation to Tomsky (late 1920 - early 1921), Rykov, Smilga, Zinoviev and Bukharin (autumn 1921) (see: Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU: 1989: No. 4: pp. 161-168 No. 9, pp. 161–167, RGASPI, F. 2, op. 24638. L. 1–1v., D. 24657. L. 1–1v.).

[439] The only person other than Stalin who received Lenin's close systematic attention was Rykov. An interesting correspondence on this subject, which lasted almost a year and a half, from May 1921 to the end of 1922, was published in Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. P. 161–168; No. 9. C: 161 - 167). True, unlike Stalin, Rykov was seriously ill.

[440] RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24278. L. 1, 2.

[441] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1009. L. 1.

[442] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 10, 39; Lenin collection. T. XXXIX S. 299; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 10. S. 639; T. 11. S. 92; RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1250. L. 1.

[443] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 99.

[444] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 5. S. 177–178.

[445] RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24546. L. 1–2.

[446] Ibid. D. 24543. L. 1–1 rev., 3 rev. - 4 about.

[447] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 45.

[448] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1417. L. 1–1 rev.

[449] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 162.

[450] Ibid. pp. 82–83; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 8. S. 150.

[451] RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24622. L. 1.

[452] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2176. L. 1–5 rev.

[453] Ibid. D. 5193. L. 1–2.