Lenin And Stalin: Tactical Differences on Questions of Union of the Soviet Republics

The Reality of History and the Myths of Politics

Selected articles from the book “Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics” by Sakharov V.A.

Translation from Russian by Comrade Svitlana, Marxist Leninist Discussion Group, and few by paid translator. (Final book and articles here may have slight differences)

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One of the key problems of Lenin's "Political Testament" is the problem of nation-state construction in connection with the formation of the USSR. Therefore, it is important for us to find out Lenin's views on those problems that were reflected in the texts of the Testament, as well as to study the nature and dynamics of his relationship with I.V. Stalin in connection with the discussion that arose about the construction of the USSR.

First of all, let us clarify Lenin's views on the goals of nation-state building in the conditions of the socialist revolution, in particular, his attitude to unitarism, federation and confederation, his attitude to those forms in which the state unification of the Soviet republics was conceived.

It is known that the Bolsheviks initially focused on a unitary socialist state with the provision of compactly living peoples with the rights of regional (local) autonomy. It was these views that formed the basis of the decisions of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR (January 1918) [704].

The question of the realization of the right of nations to self-determination, up to the state secession, was decided in each individual case, taking into account various circumstances and only from the point of view of creating better conditions for the development of the revolution that had begun in Russia [705].

Lenin considered federalism only as a necessary stage on the way to the creation of a unitary socialist state [706]. Stalin held the same views. Based on this idea of the fate of federalism, he formulated the General Provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic [707], agreed with Lenin and approved by him, which the constitutional commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR took as the basis of its work [708].

The “Basic Provisions” formulated by Stalin served as the basis for the fundamental provisions of the second section of the Constitution of the RSFSR, adopted by the Fifth Congress of Soviets on July 10, 1918 [709] This assessment of the Federation was later enshrined in the Program of the RCP(b), adopted by the VIII Party Congress [710], as well as in the decisions of the Second Congress of the Comintern (1920) [711]. Lenin did not recognize confederations as a form of unification of the Soviet republics acceptable to the Comintern [712].

From these fundamental views on the goals and methods of nation-state building, the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) proceeded, pointing to the "experience of Russia" (i.e., the RSFSR) as a model that should be the basis for further nation-state building [713]. Such an assessment is nothing more than the approval of the principle of "autonomization", which allows, without breaking the existing realities (the fact of the existence of republics and the development of national self-consciousness among the peoples), but using them, to ensure the evolution of the union of states within the framework of a federation into a union of peoples within a unitary states. The fundamental orientation towards the unification of the republics, given by the 10’th Congress of the RCP (b), immediately began to be translated into the plane of practical decisions [714].

However, this course met with strong opposition from the party and Soviet leadership of Georgia. Already in April 1921, they began to fight against the unification of the railways, in the summer - over the representation of the Cheka in Tbilisi, and after that, in August 1921 - the economic association of the Transcaucasian republics [715].

In addressing issues of nation-building in the Caucasus, Lenin used the knowledge, experience, and authority of Stalin [716], who in practical matters was more cautious than Lenin, taking into account local features more fully. This was most clearly manifested in the history of the discussion in the Politburo of the issue of creating an Economic Bureau to coordinate the economy of the Transcaucasian republics, which was put forward by the Transcaucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). This plan was opposed by some of the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of Georgia and Azerbaijan, saw in it a threat to the independence of their republics. The Politburo, with the active participation of Lenin, supported the proposal for the economic integration of the Transcaucasian republics [717]. Lenin proposed that this decision be put into practice in an accelerated regime, while Stalin pointed out the impossibility of this. Lenin accepted Stalin's remarks and his proposals [718].

At the beginning of 1922, the process of unification of the Soviet republics entered a new phase. Work in this direction was stimulated by the invitation of the Soviet republics to take part in the international Genoa Conference. And again, Stalin took a position that denied any speeding up of the unification process without proper political preparation. January 12, 1922 I.V. Stalin submitted a proposal to the Politburo to begin preparations for the unification of the republics into a single state:

“In connection with the question of the composition and powers of our delegation to the European conference, the question arises of our independent republics (both Soviet and the Far East).

At the conference, for the first time, the question of the borders of the RSFSR and the legal relations between the independent republics and the RSFSR will have to be dealt with. Undoubtedly our opponents will try to reveal all the uncertainty and inconsistency in these relations, find gaps and try to make it impossible for the unity of the diplomatic front between the RSFSR and the independent republics, bypass the question of the FER ... not considering it connected with the RSFSR, and generally try to use all legal inconsistencies in our relations with the independent republics in order to put us in an awkward position.

Considering the undesirable prospect outlined above and proceeding from the need to establish unity on the diplomatic front, some comrades propose that all independent republics be united with the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy in the shortest possible time. While fully sharing this point of view, I consider, however, that in order to put it into practice, serious preparatory work will be required, requiring a more or less long period of time (I mean especially the Far East, Khorezm, Bukhara, Ukraine), while we need to be ready to in a month. In view of this, I consider it necessary to suggest another way:

1) Create as soon as possible a conference of chairmen of the Central Executive Committees of the independent republics (the chairman of the government must be invited from the Far East) to establish a united diplomatic front with the RSFSR and finally determine the composition of the delegation;

2) Ensure that the mandates of all members of the delegation are signed by all the chairmen (Central Executive Committees) of the Soviet republics, as well as by the chairman of the government of the Far East.

This way out is expedient in the sense that, while creating a united diplomatic front, it also saves us from raising delicate questions about the borders of the RSFSR, relations with the republics, the withdrawal of troops from Georgia, and so on.

It may be useful to report that, Comrade. Lenin expressed full agreement with the proposed plan. [719]

The plan proposed by Stalin and agreed with Lenin included not only measures to formalize the diplomatic union of the Soviet republics, but also the preparation of their unification on the basis of autonomy. Trotsky reacted to Stalin's letter with a note:

“Comrade's proposal. Stalin seems very tempting in terms of simplicity. On January 16, the Politburo decided: “To accept the proposal of Comrade Stalin with the addition of Comrade Trotsky: “to oblige the chairmen of the Central Executive Committees to stock up on the powers of their Central Executive Committees for signing treaties, agreements, etc.” [720].

Thus, in January 1922, no one in the leadership of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) considered the idea of autonomization untenable in principle, and no one objected to Stalin's proposal - the same proposal that sparked a sharp controversy in September. Only the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine Kh.G. Rakovsky [721].

The interaction of the republics in the diplomatic sphere, achieved by the beginning of 1922, did not affect their daily economic interaction, either in principle or in connection with the creation of a mechanism for ensuring it. Meanwhile, in the context of the dismantling of the old economic system and the creation of a new one based on the NEP, due to the legal unsettledness of relations, they began to escalate, threatening to develop into a complex political problem that could weaken the international positions of the Soviet republics and damage the development of their economies. The greatest tension was observed in the relations of the RSFSR with Georgia and Ukraine.

New disagreements with the Communist Party of Georgia were added to the previous ones: on the issue of the creation of the Georgian Red Army, on the implementation of a monetary reform in the Transcaucasus, on the entry of Georgian trade unions into the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, etc. [722]

In mid-1922, the Central Committee of the KKE took steps that could be assessed as a reorientation of Georgia towards economic relations with the capitalist countries. He allowed the Ottoman Bank (Anglo-French capital) to open its branch in Tiflis, which, in the conditions when the Turkish lira was ousting Georgian and Soviet money from the market in Batum and Tiflis, would inevitably lead to the financial subordination of Transcaucasia to Turkey and through it to the developed capitalist countries...The ban, adopted by the Central Committee of the RCP(b) at the insistence of Sokolnikov, caused a "storm of indignation" in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia [723]. The absence of a formal settlement of interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR forced the Politburo to act as an arbitrator, which could not be considered normal [724].

The need to urgently resolve the issue of a formal settlement of relations between the Soviet republics in one form or another became more and more obvious. Under these conditions, work intensified in Georgia and Ukraine on schemes for the unification of the Soviet republics, excluding the formation of one state and preserving the independence of the republics to the maximum. Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia P.G. Mdivani, A.S. Svanidze justified the need to unite the republics into a union of states that does not have supranational authorities and administration [725]. Mdivani's supporters had quite strong positions in the Communist Party of Azerbaijan [726].

Part of the leadership of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, in particular Rakovsky, advocated a federation with the weakest possible center. This activated supporters of the creation of a strong centralized state in the republics. L.M. Kaganovich recalled that

“in the middle of 1922, representatives of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b) went to Moscow and raised the general question of the need to strengthen federal ties with the RSFSR” [727].

Thus, in August 1922, against the backdrop of growing problems and discussions about the principles of unification, the question of regulating relations between the Soviet republics entered a decisive phase. On August 10, 1922, the Politburo heard a report by H.G. Rakovsky and D.Z. Manuilsky “On Relations between the RSFSR and Ukraine” and decided:

“To propose to the Orgburo to form a commission with an instruction for the next plenum of the Central Committee to prepare the question of relations between the RSFSR and the independent republics, for later processing it in the Soviet order” [728].

The next day, August 11, the Orgburo created such a commission consisting of I.V. Stalin, V.V. Kuibysheva (Chairman of the Commission), H.G. Rakovsky, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, G.Ya. Sokolnikov and representatives of the republics [729].

For this commission, Stalin wrote the first document that argued for the need to create a federation of Soviet republics. Stalin himself spoke about the circumstances of his appearance and assessment of his role in the formation of the USSR in a letter to Fotieva (dated February 27, 1923) in response to her request to send the text of his initial proposals on the formation of the USSR:

“According to your request, I am sending you my outline of theses on the question of the unification of the republics. It cannot be called theses, because it has not been developed, not polished, and I never called it theses either. This sketch received its development and formalization first in the well-known resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1922, and then in my theses, adopted as a basis by the Plenum of the Central Committee in February (1923 - BC) and subject (by decision of this Plenum) to a decisive assessment of Comrade Lenin. I made this sketch, I think, in August 1922 at the request of Comrades. Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, and Myasnikov in the presence of these comrades. It is known to Comrade. Lenin and approved by him when I was with Comrade Lenin in "Gorki", it seems, at the end of August p / y. ” [730] *.

This document was not introduced into scientific circulation, apparently because it destroys the legend accepted in traditional historiography. Its full text is placed in Appendix No. 1, and here we note that in it, Stalin, describing the stages in the development of relations between the Soviet republics, stated:

the collapse of the Genoa and The Hague international conferences showed that, “on the one hand, to attract foreign capital to Russia is almost impossible, and, on the other hand, the possibility of intervention is not deprived. Therefore, to defend external security and to preserve and increase the material wealth of the Soviet republics in the present conditions is possible only through a closer military-economic alliance of all Soviet republics. Such an alliance will ensure the revival of the economy and the rational use of the resources of the Soviet republics as a whole.

And he concluded:

“It is necessary to complete the process of ever-increasing rapprochement of the republics by uniting them into one federation, merging military and economic affairs and external relations (foreign affairs, foreign trade) into one whole, while maintaining independence for the republics, complete autonomy in internal affairs” [731]**.

Stalin raised the question of the formation of the USSR in the context of the tasks facing the socialist revolution and taking into account international relations. These theses became the basis for further development of various options for uniting the Soviet socialist republics into a union state. The idea of federation is not yet associated specifically with any organizational form. This question is left open. It is clear, however, that it was proposed to create a federation on the basis of those principles on which the RSFSR was created. This is the same principle that underlay Stalin's proposal to prepare for the unification of the Soviet republics, with which he addressed the members of the Politburo in January 1922, and which was agreed with and approved by Lenin. The principle that underlay the policy of the Bolsheviks in the field of nation-state building in 1917-1921 and assumed the preservation of the autonomy of the regions in resolving issues of their internal life ***.

Having received Lenin's approval, Stalin took the next step - he developed a draft document for discussion in the Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). Stalin called it the "Initial Project" (see Appendix No. 2). He proposed:

“The unification shall be based on the principle of voluntariness and equality of the republics, with each of them retaining the right to freely secede from the union”

He proposed to form "corresponding allied legislative and executive bodies", to "merge" the commissariats of the naval, communications, foreign affairs, foreign trade, posts, and telegraphs; to subordinate the republican People's Commissariats of Finance, Food, Labour, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Supreme Council of National Economy "to the directives of the corresponding Commissariats of the Union." As a principle of unification, the following provision was formulated:

"full provision of the interests of the national development of the peoples of the contracting republics." The creation of the Union was to take place after the approval of the "Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee" at the First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [732].

Here, more definitely than in the original draft, the nature of the federal formation is indicated - "one union state", but the form of federation has not yet been indicated. The evolution of a number of the most important provisions in these first documents of Stalin testified to the fact that he was looking for the most acceptable solutions in the face of opposition.

In the third document in a row****, Stalin takes one more step: he proposes to create not just one union state , but a single state through the so-called "autonomization" of the republics:

"To recognize as expedient the formal entry of independent Soviet republics ... into the RSFSR" . Accordingly, the thesis about the federation as one union state, which has lost its relevance, disappears. The proposal for the entry of the Transcaucasian republics into the USSR as part of the Transcaucasian Federation, which greatly irritated the leadership of the Communist Party of Georgia, loses its meaning.”

Stalin, in full accordance with the principle of "autonomization", offers them to join the Union each separately. The question of the Far Eastern Republic, the democratic republics of Bukhara and Khorezm, he thought to leave "open", "limiting himself to the adoption of agreements with them on customs, foreign trade, foreign and military affairs, and so on." He proposed:

"To recognize as expedient the formal extension of the competence of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the RSFSR to the corresponding central Soviet institutions listed in paragraph 1 of the republics." "The foreign affairs (Indel, Vneshtorg), military affairs, railway, financial and sweat ... ***** independent republics should be united with those of the RSFSR ... People's Commissariats: food, labor and the national economy formally subordinate to the directives of the relevant RSFSR people's commissariats." Organs for the fight against counter-revolution - "subordinate to the directives of the Code of Civil Procedure of the RSFSR." The rest of the People's Commissariats (Justice, Education, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, public health, and social security) should have retained their independence. The decision to unite was supposed to be “carried out in the Soviet order through the Central Executive Committees or Congresses of Soviets” of the republics, and at the All-Russian Congress to declare the creation of the USSR “as a wish” of the republics [733].

The scheme proposed by Stalin for the unification of the Soviet republics made it possible to avoid a complex hierarchical structure of nations and peoples, whose declared equality turned into their actual inequality, enshrined in the Constitution: in fact, only those republics and their “titular” nations and peoples that were directly part of the Union of Republics were recognized as equal. The equality of others was limited by the rights only to this or that autonomy.

Stalin's new project was sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The Central Committees of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and Armenia spoke out in favor of unification on the basis of "autonomization". The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia considered the state association "premature" and spoke in favor of an economic association. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus called for the establishment of relations between the BSSR and the RSFSR on principles similar to those that would be established between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR [734]. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine delayed the answer and asked to postpone the meeting in the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the issue of relations with the RSFSR, scheduled for September 22, until October 15 [735].

On the eve of the start of the work of the commission of the Orgburo, Stalin wrote to Lenin his arguments in favor of his plan. On September 22, 1922, in response to Lenin's note, the content of which is still unknown to historians, Stalin replied with an extensive letter in which he developed the argument in favor of the proposal to federate the republics on the principle of autonomization as the most fully responsive to the task of creating a convenient, and therefore effective, control system national economy in the interests of socialist construction. There is nothing in this letter to indicate that they have disagreements.

“We have come to a situation,” he wrote,

“when the existing order of relations between the center and the outskirts, i.e. the absence of any order and complete chaos (it is unlikely that Lenin could have liked such a statement. - BC), becomes intolerable, creates conflicts, resentment, and irritation, turns the so-called unified federal national economy into a fiction, slows down and paralyzes all economic activity on an all-Russian scale ". “Formally, the decisions of the Council of People’s Commissars, the STO and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR are not binding on the independent republics, and these institutions very often cancel the decisions of the central institutions of the independent republics, which causes protests by the latter against the “illegal actions” of the central institutions of Moscow ... The intervention of the Central Committee of the RCP in such cases usually occurs after the central institutions of the border regions had already issued their decrees, later canceled by the central institutions of Moscow, which creates red tape and a brake on economic affairs and causes bewilderment among the non-party people and irritation among the communists in the border regions.

From this, Stalin drew the conclusion:

“One of two things: either real independence or then non-intervention of the center, its own People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, its own Foreign Trade, its own Concession Committee, its own railways, moreover, common questions are resolved through negotiations on an equal footing, by agreement ... or a real unification of the Soviet republics into one economic entity with the formal extension of the power of the Council of People's Commissars, the STO and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR to the Council of People's Commissars, the Central Executive Committee and the economic councils of independent republics, i.e. replacement of fictitious independence by real internal autonomy of the republics in the sense of language and culture, justice, internal affairs, agriculture, and so on. “

A significant place in the letter was occupied by an analysis of opposition to the unification of the republics.

“During the four years of the civil war, when, due to intervention, we were forced to demonstrate Moscow’s liberalism on the national question, we managed to educate among the communists, against our will, real and consistent social independents who demand real independence in every sense and regard the intervention of the Central Committee of the RCP as deceit and hypocrisy on the part of Moscow... We are going through a period of development when the form, the law, the constitution cannot be ignored, when the young generation of communists on the outskirts refuse to understand the game of independence as a game, stubbornly recognizing words about independence at face value and also stubbornly demanding from us the implementation of the letter of the constitution of the independent republics.”

From this, Stalin drew the conclusion in favor of decisive, offensive tactics:

“if we do not now replace formal (fictitious) independence with formal (and at the same time real) autonomy, then in a year it will be incomparably more difficult to defend the actual unity of the Soviet republics. Now we are talking about how not to "offend" the nationals; in a year, it will probably be a question of how not to cause a split in the party on this basis, because the "national" element does not work in the border regions in favor of the unity of the Soviet republics, and formal independence favors this work. [736]. The letter ended with a summary of Stalin's plan.

A not quite correct understanding of the role of "autonomization" in Stalin's plans has been established in the literature. It is presented as a way of restricting the rights of the republics, concentrating power in the center and, consequently, concentrating it in Stalin's hands. The above letter shows that Stalin was guided by completely different considerations. Proceeding from the recognition of the obvious - the absence of actual independence of the republics - he proposed only to legitimize the existing state of affairs, to formalize it, but at the same time clearly designate the sphere of independence of the republics. Therefore, “autonomization” acted not as a way to limit the rights of the republics, but as a way to combine the power of a strong center with real power remaining in the localities, and also as a way to simplify administrative structures. Finally, as a way to ensure the transition from a federation to a unitary state, a transition carried out not on the basis of a violation of the right of nations to self-determination, but on the basis of its implementation and on the condition that it is especially important, providing them with a new law for the theory and practice of the socialist revolution - the right free exit from the Union.

The Commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), with the participation of all interested parties, discussed Stalin's draft on September 23 and 24 with a number of changes and clarifications that are not of fundamental importance. It was adopted and formalized as "Resolution on the relations of the RSFSR with the independent republics in the final version, adopted by the commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)". The resolution was sent to all members and candidates of the Central Committee of the party.

The Commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) actually proposed to move on to the implementation of the scheme for the unification of the republics, which was proposed by Stalin in January 1922, and met with no objections either from Lenin or from other members of the Politburo. It must be assumed that Stalin could expect continued criticism from Rakovsky, Mdivani and others, but he had the right to expect support from members of the Politburo. However, life (itself) made serious amendments: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Kalinin, Bukharin criticized the autonomization plan. Trotsky silently waited.

It is sometimes claimed in the literature that in the early phase of the discussion of Stalin's proposals, Lenin was isolated from information about the ensuing discussion. It is implied, if not explicitly stated, that Stalin was responsible for this isolation. This is not true. The available documents (including the registration logs of the Lenin secretariat) indicate that in August-September 1922 V.I. Lenin received the entire stream of fundamentally important documents related to the formation of the USSR, which were sent by the secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to all members of the Central Committee, and, moreover, he received information sent to him personally, both in writing and orally [ 737].

At this time, Lenin was relatively active, dealing with issues of party work, the organization of concessions and foreign trade, the problems of Donbass, the conflict in the NKPS, under the concession of L. Urquhart and others. But in the most important political issue - the unification of the republics - until September 26, he did not show any visible activity. This may indicate that until the mid-20s of September, the formation of the USSR on the basis of autonomy did not cause him any concern or protest.

On September 26, 1922, Lenin wrote to Kamenev about his opinion on the Stalinist project:

“In my opinion, the question is paramount. Stalin has a little tendency to hurry. It is necessary for you (you once had the intention to do this and even did a little) to think carefully, Zinoviev too.

He further writes that

“Stalin has already agreed to make one concession. In § 1, instead of "joining" the RSFSR, say "Formal unification together with the RSFSR into a union of the Soviet republics of Europe and Asia." The spirit of this concession, I hope, is understandable: we recognize ourselves as equal in rights with the Ukrainian SSR and others, and together and on an equal footing with them we enter a new union, a new federation, the "Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia."

In accordance with the new construction, Lenin proposes the creation of a federal state body - the "All-Federal All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia." Lenin also explains his motivation:

"It is important that we do not give food to the 'independents'.(highlighted by us. - BC), did not destroy their independence, but created another new level, a federation of equal republics.

Lenin's other proposals - regarding the right of "central institutions" to appeal to the federal Central Executive Committee against the decisions of the federal Council of People's Commissars and the STO, without suspending their implementation, as well as regarding the structure of the central government, the mechanism for the creation, functioning and powers of their regional representative offices - did not change the concept proposed by Stalin.

The nature of a fundamental change was Lenin's proposal (presumably) to "merge" the people's commissariats of finance, food, labor and the national economy of the republics, that is, to turn them, like those listed above, into union, federal departments, liquidating them in the republics. Stalin, on the other hand, suggested that these republican people's commissariats "formally subordinate to the directives of the corresponding people's commissariats of the RSFSR", i.e. he proposed to create a floor of the union-republican departments. Lenin did not consider this to be expedient, and thereby proposed that much more executive power be withdrawn from the republics than Stalin did. Consequently, the degree of centralization of executive power in Lenin's version was much greater than in Stalin's version, and they had much less real independence.

“This is my preliminary draft,” wrote Lenin.

- Based on conversations with Mdivani and other comrades, I will add and change. I beg you to do the same and answer me.” [738]

He also reported that Stalin agreed to postpone the submission of the resolution to the Politburo of the Central Committee until his return, and about his desire to meet with Kamenev and Rykov.

Let's pay attention to the fact that in this letter there is no criticism of "autonomization" as a principle of unification. It appears only among the interpreters of Lenin's text. It is only a matter of tactical expediency.

The next day, September 27, Stalin sent Lenin, as well as Zinoviev, Kalinin, Kamenev, Molotov, Rykov, Tomsky, Trotsky, a reply to Lenin's letter. He agreed with the replacement of the principle of autonomization, which implied the "entry" of the republics into the RSFSR, with "the formal union of the Soviet socialist republics of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia with the RSFSR into the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia. "

Stalin objected to the proposal to create a federal Central Executive Committee for reasons of political and organizational-administrative inexpediency: it would lead "to the mandatory creation of a Russian Central Executive Committee with the exclusion of eight autonomous republics ... that are part of the RSFSR, to the declaration of the latter as independent along with Ukraine and other independent republics , to the creation of two chambers in Moscow (Russian and federal), and, in general, to deep restructuring, which at the moment is not caused by either internal or external necessity and which, in my opinion, is inappropriate under the given conditions and, in any case, premature."

In his opinion, such a reorganization "will give nothing but conflicts and friction." Stalin proposed to transform the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR into a federal Central Executive Committee. He also objected to the liquidation of the union-republican people's commissariats and their transformation into allied (all-federal) ones, noting that "it can hardly be doubted that this" haste "will give food to the "independents" to the detriment of Comrade Lenin's national liberalism." He referred to Lenin's other amendments as "purely" editorial or "superfluous" [739].

It is usually noted that Stalin easily agreed to a concession. This is true, but only in part. As you can see, Stalin easily made a concession only in relation to paragraph 1 - in terms of formal recognition of the preservation of the state independence of the uniting republics. The reason for compliance is seen in Lenin's authority and unwillingness to go into conflict with him, which could damage his political career. It is impossible to agree with this, since Stalin did not yield on other important issues and, in harsh terms, challenged Lenin's proposals. The reason for the concession, I think, is that, as was shown above, in principle he allowed the version of the Union of Republics, stipulating only that this union should be "one union state." The equality of the republics under Stalin was stipulated in the "Initial Project" (end of August - beginning of September 1922) as a principle. Lenin's proposal on the 1st paragraph did not deal with fundamental disagreements with Stalin. Hence Stalin's compliance. It is noteworthy that Lenin did not reply to Stalin on the substance of his objections. In addition, in the works of October 1922 - March 1923. Lenin did not criticize any of those who advocated the creation of an effectively working mechanism of control. Moreover, he emphasized in every possible way the importance of its creation and did not offer to sacrifice it to the “independents”.

Stalin's concession and stubbornness will be clearer if we consider that the thesis of "autonomization" occupied an important place in his project, but still it was not the main one. He pointed to the most advantageous, in Stalin's opinion, way of solving the problem. The main thing is the idea of a Union of Republics as a single state with a strong central authority capable of developing towards a unitary socialist state of a union of peoples. “Autonomization" in this case was only one of the acceptable options for solving the problem, but not the only one. It was possible to go to it through a union of equal states, so Stalin, having conceded on paragraph 1, tried to maintain the management scheme that he proposed. This is also understandable: the formal recognition of the equality of the republics in the Union is not an insurmountable problem on the way to achieving the main goals in the field of nation-state construction of a unitary socialist state. The development of the Union and its future will be largely determined by the system of power and administration.

The question arises: why did Lenin, who previously did not object to “autonomization” as a form of federation with a strong center, suddenly come out against it at the end of September? It is not possible to obtain an unambiguous satisfactory answer on the material available to historians. One has to choose between two main options: firstly, he changed his fundamental approach to issues of nation-state building, and secondly, he abandoned it for tactical reasons. In traditional historiography, the first version of the explanation is accepted. A powerful argument in favor of him are the notes "On Nationalities or on "Autonomization"".

A letter from Lenin to Kamenev dated September 26 (which was discussed above), as well as a number of other facts, testifies in favor of the second option. It is believed that Lenin sent a letter to all members of the Politburo [740]. However, it is not. The office documents of the Lenin Secretariat show that Lenin sent this “secret letter” “on autonomous republics” only to his supporters in the Politburo: Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin, Kalinin, Tomsky, Rykov, Molotov. It was not sent to Trotsky [741]. By including Trotsky among the addressees, the PSS publishers created a distorted picture of Lenin's relationship not so much with Stalin, but with Trotsky as well. Apparently, Trotsky was bypassed not by chance.

True, on September 7, the Politburo granted him leave from September 13, 1922 [742], but he was in Moscow, and, moreover, the leave did not mean removal from political life, but only release from the current work. Kamenev, to whom the letter was addressed, had also been on leave since September 14 [743]. On the other hand, Stalin, answering Lenin, sent his letter to all members of the Politburo, including Trotsky ******.

Therefore, there is every reason to assume that Lenin decided not to involve him in the discussion of the issue, on which there were disagreements among supporters. This assumption is also supported by the fact that in the course of the discussion no significant documentary “trail” emerged, even remotely resembling the one left behind by another acute issue of that time - the monopoly of foreign trade. Such an assumption fully corresponds to what we know about Lenin's political style and fits into the course of the political struggle that was then unfolding between Lenin and Trotsky. This may indicate Lenin's desire to limit the discussion of the disagreement that had arisen to a narrow circle of the immediate political environment. The leaders of the nationalist deviators were not acquainted with this letter, which may indicate that his support for their demands was caused not by a commonality of views and not by Lenin's revision of his principled positions, but by tactical considerations.

Kamenev's note to Lenin of September 27 also indicates that we are dealing with tactical differences. Kamenev wrote:

“In my opinion, either do not touch the question of “independence” at all (which, apparently, is no longer possible), or conduct the Union in such a way as to preserve formal independence as much as possible, i.e. approximately according to the proposed scheme” [744].

Again, everything is "revolving" around how to extinguish the activity of the "independents". The short notes exchanged between Stalin and Kamenev on September 28******* also point to Lenin's tactical maneuvering. Kamenev wrote:

“Ilyich is going to war in defense of independence. Offers me to see the Georgians. Refuses even yesterday's amendments. Maria Ilyinichna called. Stalin replied: “We need, in my opinion, firmness against Ilyich. If a couple of Georgian Mensheviks influence the Georgian communists, and the latter on Ilyich, one asks, what does "independence" have to do with it?

Kamenev shares his thoughts:

“I think, since Vladimir Ilyich insists, it will be worst resist."

Stalin defines his position:

“I don’t know. Let him do as he pleases.” [745]

On September 27, Lenin met with a supporter of autonomization - the secretary of the Zakkraykom of the RCP (b) G. K. Ordzhonikidze, as well as the leader of the Georgian national deviators P. G. Mdivani. The next day - with supporters of Mdivani, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia M.S. Okudzhava, L.E. Dumbadze, K.M. Tsintsadze and with a supporter of the Stalin project, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Armenia A.F. Myasnikov [746]. Unfortunately, there is almost no reliable detailed information about these conversations in the hands of historians. It can be assumed that Lenin decided to maneuver in order to ensure the unification of the republics with a concession, not to delay it, but to speed it up, without getting involved in a political struggle. He put the question before them like this:

"If "autonomization" is bad, what about the "Union"? Supporters of Mdivani were delighted: Georgia and Russia are equal in the Union and agreed [747].

True, they agreed, as it soon became clear, insincere.

The essence of tactical differences, obviously, is that Stalin was determined to stand firm in the face of the onslaught of national deviators in the RCP (b), while Lenin considered the tactics of maneuvering and finding compromises to be more expedient. The question arises as to why they chose different tactics. Two main reasons can be pointed out. The first consisted in a different assessment of the political strength and capabilities of the national deviationists. Stalin did not evaluate them as significant. Obviously, Lenin was not worried about Mdivani, Rakovsky and their like-minded people themselves, but that they could express (they assured!) the moods of the broad masses. To what extent was Lenin right in making a concession to the national deviationists?

In Georgia, all the tricks of Mdivani and his supporters to raise the party organization against the course of creating a lasting alliance with other Soviet republics did not bring them success - their influence, as the next congress of the KKE showed, it was rapidly falling. The same was in Ukraine. Rakovsky later, at the 12th Congress, expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that in Ukraine it was difficult "for us to make them (the party organizations. - BC) understand the significance of the national question." With displeasure, as a dangerous phenomenon, he fixes “the calmness with which, in particular, the Russian part of our party relates to disputes, which, unfortunately, have taken on too local coloring” [748]. So, in Ukraine, a lot of party members are against Rakovsky, which means they are for Stalin.

The second reason was the different arrangement of priorities in the question of the immediate tasks of the socialist revolution. Stalin believed that

“in Georgia they made a fetish of the tactics of concessions, meanwhile, now is the time not for political concessions, but, on the contrary, for a political offensive, as in Russia. The class struggle is sharpening on the national question, and most of the party (meaning the KKE - BC) and the old Central Committee persist in this and do not want to understand this.” [749]

Hence his attention was to the problems of management. To the task of creating a management system capable of ensuring the creation of a powerful economic organism as a guarantor of the victory of the socialist revolution, he was ready to sacrifice the interests of the nationalist-minded part of the population and their defenders in the ranks of the Communist Party.

Lenin, apparently, tried to avoid even a slight aggravation of the internal party struggle and to provide opportunities for political maneuver within the country and thus get the time needed for economic construction. This position fit perfectly into the general scheme of the NEP. In this case, he preferred a political maneuver to political pressure on opponents. Besides, apparently, the old scheme of the United States of Europe was still on the minds of people. No wonder he suggested changing the name of the state accordingly. It is possible that Lenin's assessments of the expediency of this or that form of federal association were influenced by the hopes for a relatively close victory of the world revolution, to which his thoughts about the "Union of the Republics of Europe and Asia" were oriented. The "Union of equals" in these conditions could seem more preferable to him from the point of view of his growth at the expense of the new socialist states.

The scheme of the "Union of equals", allowing to strengthen propaganda outside the country and fight the propaganda of nationalists, demanded as a payment for this complication of management processes and an increase in the cost of the management apparatus. The "Union of equals" also led to the legalization of the formal and actual inequality of different peoples and republics. Some received the right to form union republics and become subjects of the USSR. Others received the right to form only autonomous republics and joined the USSR as part of the RSFSR or ZFSR. Still others have not yet received such rights. Satisfying the demands of some, this scheme caused an aggravation of dissatisfaction among others, who considered themselves infringed in their rights. Such a situation promised in the future not an end to the contradictions, but their aggravation, the replacement of old "fronts" with new ones. The rejected autonomization plan, with its well-known shortcomings, made it possible to avoid these contradictions, to make all peoples really equal in rights and to organically merge two different processes - the unification of states and peoples. But it was precisely the latter that was the main task in the field of nation-state construction from the point of view of the interests of the socialist revolution.

Stalin perfectly understood this concern and Lenin's calculations but did not share them. Within the framework of the "Union of Equals", national-state formations, instead of evolving towards integration within a single organism to a unitary state, received a consolidation of their status, which made it difficult to overcome national differences and gave them a political character, instead of translating relations between peoples exclusively within the framework of economic, cultural relations, etc.

Thus, there are sufficient grounds to say that on the issue of the unification of the Soviet republics, the disagreements between Lenin and Stalin were not of a fundamental, but of a tactical nature, they did not go beyond the search for the most appropriate ways and methods of their solution. Naturally, if different positions or interests are chosen as a “reference point”, then different solutions will seem appropriate. Between Lenin and Stalin there was a discussion about the most acceptable solution to the problem of the unification of the republics under the given conditions. At some point, it became tense. Tactical differences, like any other, could, of course, grow over time. But that did not happen. The discussion did not turn into a fight.

After an exchange of views, the draft commission of the Orgburo was finalized and the revised text was sent to members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in a letter signed by Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov, and Molotov with a warning:

“We believe that the resolution of the Central Committee Commission on the issue of relations between RSFSR and the independent republics (it was distributed to the members and candidates of the Central Committee) on the basis of a correct and, of course, acceptable, some points need to be clarified, mainly concerning the structure of the all-Union central bodies and partly their functions. We were convinced of this by our conversations with some members of the Central Committee and with a number of local nationals. Accordingly, we submit to the Central Committee the following, slightly modified, more precise formulation of the decision of the Commission of the Central Committee.

A comparison of Lenin's proposals with the revised draft resolution shows that that not all of his proposals were accepted. The first paragraph was revised in the spirit of Lenin's proposal:

“1. To recognize as necessary the conclusion of an agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR on their unification into the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" with the reserving of each of them the right to freely secede from the "Union" [750].

Paragraph 2 was adjusted in connection with the creation of a federal level of power in accordance with Lenin's proposals. But his proposal regarding the name of the Union was rejected and the Stalinist version, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was retained. Paragraph 3 took into account the new principle of forming the Union, but Lenin's proposals to eliminate the union-republican level of government and the editorial changes he proposed were rejected. Lenin's proposals regarding paragraphs 4 and 5 were also rejected********.

The nature of the concessions to Lenin made in the final version of the draft theses "On the relations of the RSFSR with the independent Soviet Socialist Republics" also indirectly testifies in favor of the version of Lenin's tactical maneuvering. A kind of compensation for the rejection of "autonomization" was the provision that federal authorities are formed from representatives of the republican CECs "in proportion to the population they represent" [751].

This meant the recognition of the need to strengthen the role of the RSFSR in the formation of federal authorities. Lenin accepted this addition. And this is natural, because he was not a principled opponent of a state with a strong central government, and in the USSR the center of gravity, the main base of socialist construction was just the RSFSR.

It was this project that was proposed to the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) (October 5–8, 1922). The question of the unification of the Soviet republics was discussed on October 6. The minutes of its meetings have not been published, so the analysis of the discussion that took place at it is extremely difficult. The plenum heard the "Report of the commission on the relationship between the RSFSR and the independent republics," delivered by Stalin. When this issue was discussed at the meeting of the Plenum, Mdivani [752] was present, who left a small sketch of what was happening:

“I am very sorry that I cannot personally report on the debate on this issue, but one thing is interesting that the debate lasted for 3 hours - this is something monstrous at the Plenums, where issues are resolved with cinematic speed. The debate showed that a certain part of the Central Committee directly denies the existence of the national question and is entirely infected with great-power tendencies, but this part received such a slap in the face that it will not soon decide to return again from the hole where LENIN drove it (learn about his moods from his letter, which was read out at the end of the meeting after solution of the question *********), look, do not lose the letter, I begged to Kamenev.

Yes, the atmosphere has dissipated a little, but it may thicken again if we fail to put the matter of information well ... We must seriously prepare and gather all our strength, both for the Transcaucasian congress and for the all-Russian congress. “At first (without Lenin) we were beaten in a Mordovian way, ridiculing us, and then, when Lenin intervened, after our meeting with him and detailed information, the matter turned towards the communist mind ... On the question of relations, a voluntary alliance was adopted on the basis of equality, and as a result of all this the suffocating atmosphere against us dissipated; on the contrary, the Great Powers were attacked in the plenum of the Central Committee—that is what Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others said. The project belongs, of course, to Lenin, but it was submitted on behalf of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and others, who immediately changed the front” [753].

This letter, which has a number of inaccuracies and, moreover, reproduces the point of view of only one side, cannot serve as a reliable source of information. Nevertheless, there are interesting confessions in it, indicating that Mdivani and his supporters received support from Lenin only after they complained to him and exerted psychological pressure. The available information about Lenin's work on that day allows us to conclude that Lenin was not absorbed in the issue that was discussed at the Plenum. There are four notes by Lenin to Kamenev dated October 6 and dating back to the time of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), but only one of them is devoted to issues of national construction, the other two to the issues of the Urquhart concession, another one to the state of health and a request to invite Chubar to Lenin [ 754].

Perhaps it was to them that Kamenev answered Lenin, and Mdivani perceived this as Lenin's feverish work in support of the Georgian national deviationists. The note devoted to the issue discussed at the Plenum is well known:

"I declare a fight to the death against Great Russian chauvinism.".[755]

This is followed by a proposal for the alternate chairmanship of the Union Central Executive Committee of a Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, etc.

It is believed that, speaking of the Great Russian chauvinists, Lenin had in mind Stalin and his supporters. But Stalin had already conceded on that main point, which, in principle, could give rise to such an accusation. The disagreements that emerged in matters of designing the organs of power and administration did not give grounds for reproaching him for "Great Russian chauvinism."

Moreover, with regard to the concentration of power in the center due to its reduction in the localities, Lenin went much further than Stalin, therefore, he himself, with no less reason, could be included in the "Great Russian chauvinists", "great powers", etc. In addition, the thesis about Great Russian chauvinism in the note is organically linked to the discussion about the functioning of the highest authority, about how to organize the work of the Central Executive Committee. Nothing is known about his disagreements with Stalin on this issue. Nothing indicates that that this accusation was directed against Stalin. The question of whom Lenin had in mind remains open.

The plenum adopted a draft resolution, revised taking into account Lenin's proposals. It was decided to create the USSR as a "Union of equals". For reasons that are still not entirely clear, the resolution lacked the important provision that the new federation was one allied state, which allowed the Union to be interpreted as a federation with a weak central authority, not much different from a confederation. It was indeed a fundamental concession to the "independents".

Stalin had to give in at this stage of the struggle, but, apparently, only in order to prepare a new offensive and ensure victory in the struggle for the creation of a federation as one union state - the goal that he had formulated from the very beginning. For the preparation of draft documents that were to be considered by the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR (“with preliminary submission for approval by the Central Committee”), a commission of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) was created consisting of Stalin, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Rykov, Chicherin, Kalinin and representatives of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belarus. Stalin became its chairman [756].

This indicated that the Plenum of the Central Committee expressed political confidence in him, and he got the opportunity to actively influence the further process of the formation of the USSR. Lenin saw no danger in this.

* Stalin visited Lenin on 19 and 30 August. Obviously, on one of these days, Lenin was acquainted with Stalin's proposal and approved it.

** In the typewritten text, the last phrase looks like this: “into one whole, preserving autonomy for the republics in internal affairs” (RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 278. L. 2; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 266-267).

*** Neither in January 1921 (letter to the Politburo) nor in August-September 1922 did Stalin use the term "autonomization". Lenin did not use it either during the discussion of the principles of the unification of the Soviet republics. There is not this term in official documents. Who is the "author" of it is unknown. For the first time, this concept entered the political life of the party in the title of the notes “On the Question of Nationalities or “Autonomization””, which, as will be shown below, there are no sufficient grounds to associate with the name of Lenin.

**** Publishers in Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU date it "not earlier than August 11" (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. P. 192). Unfortunately, the material available to historians allows us to establish the time of creation of this version of the draft resolution only approximately. If we consider that the first document of Stalin was created and agreed with Lenin at the end of August (presumably on the 30th), and the second - in the first days of September (September 12, Stalin was with Lenin), then the third version, apparently, appeared no earlier than the first days September (2-3rd) and no later than September 10-11, since the protocol of the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan on September 11 definitely speaks of Stalin's proposal to hold a federation on the basis of autonomy (Ibid., pp. 19, 196).

***** People's Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs

****** The inclusion of Trotsky in the list of addressees at first glance contradicts what we said about the reasons for Lenin's exclusion of Trotsky from the list of addressees of the letter. However, this fact confirms our assumption rather than rejects it. Stalin, as the actual head of the commission and the author of the draft, agrees to amend the draft, which has already been sent out as an official document to the members of the Central Committee, so he, of course, could not ignore Trotsky. Lenin's letter, on the other hand, pursued a different goal - to outline his own position in the face of his supporters and to argue his amendments to the submitted draft resolution.

******* The notes are not dated and do not have traces of registration in the secretariats of Stalin or Kamenev (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 1-1 rev.), therefore, one cannot be sure that they were indeed written at this time.

******** According to paragraph 4, instead of formally subordinating the republican People's Commissariats of Finance, Food, Labor, and the National Economy to "the directives of the relevant People's Commissariats of the RSFSR", it was proposed to "merge them upon agreement of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee". In paragraph 5, Lenin proposed adding: “with the establishment of purely deliberative (or only deliberative) conferences or congresses (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. P. 205; Lenin V.I. Full. sobr. soch. T. 45. S. 212).

********* This is a note to Kamenev dated October 6, 1922.

Notes:

[704] See: Formation of the USSR. Sat. documents. 1917–1924 M.; L., 1949. S. 29–35.

705] Ibid. S. 25, 34.

[706] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 36. S. 73.

[707] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 4. S. 72–73, 79–80.

[708] See: Sakharov V.A. Formation of Soviet federalism // International scientific conference. Public Administration: History and Modernity (May 29–30, 1997). M., 1998. S. 162–164.

[709] Formation of the USSR. Sat. documents. 1917-1924. S. 54.

[710] CPSU in resolutions... T. 2. S. 79.

[711] Second Congress of the Comintern. M., 1934. S. 492.

[712] RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24248. L. 1–2.

[713] The CPSU in resolutions... Vol. 2, pp. 363, 364–365.

[714] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 43. S. 198–200, 256–257; T. 52. S. 135–136; Education of the USSR. Sat. documents. pp. 227-230.

[715] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 7–17; D. 102. L. 3.

[716] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 193. L. 2; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 165; Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 95–97.

[717] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 227–230.

[718] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 255, 565-566; He is . Op. Ed. 3. T. XXVII. S. 94; Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 229; Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 184; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24204. L. 1-1 rev.

[719] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1954. L. 1–1 rev.

[720] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 159, 160.

[721] Ibid. L. 272–274.

[722] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 7–17.

[723] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 199.

[724] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 290. L. 2; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 19–23.

[725] Domestic history. 1992. No. 4. S. 90.

[726] Chivadze Sh.I. Along the path indicated by V.I. Lenin (On the 60th anniversary of the XII Party Congress) // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1983. No. 4. S. 69.

[727] Kaganovich L.M. Aide-memoires of a worker, Bolshevik communist, trade union, party, and Soviet state worker. M., 1996. S. 297.

[728] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 306. L. 1.

[729] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 191.

[730] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 278. L. 2.

[731] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 262-265 (manuscript-autograph).

[732] Ibid. L. 241.

[733] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 192–193.

[734] Ibid. pp. 195–197.

[735] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 183–185.

[736] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 198–200.

[737] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 8. L. 159v.; D. 9. L. 2v–15v; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989 No. 9. S. 198–200, 206–208.

[738] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 211–213.

[739] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 208.

[740] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 213.

[741] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 8. L. 159v.

[742] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 311. L. 2.

[743] Ibid. D. 312. L. 4.

[744] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 206–207.

[745] Ibid. pp. 208–209:

[746] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 686–687.

[747] Harmandaryan S.V. Lenin and the formation of the Transcaucasian Federation. 1921 - 1923. Yerevan, 1969. S. 344.

[748] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 528. [749] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 66.

[750] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 205.

[751] Ibid. S. 206.

[752] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 84. L. 1.

[753] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 26. L. 29–29 rev.

[754] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 214; T. 54. S. 293–295.

[755] Ibid. T. 45. S. 214.

[756] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 84. L. 1.